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whom are they owed? To effectively
carry out his responsibilities, the cor-
porate lawyer must have clearly in
mind the answers to both questions.
As noted, Ethical Consideration 5-18
is viewed by some critics as unsatisfac-
tory in identifying the corporate client.
Section 1.13 of the ABA Commission's
Draft Rules speaks directly to this point
when the need for client identity is
greatest, i.e., when a corporate man-
ager has taken or will take action which
counsel believes is improper or illegal.
The proposed section specifies that a
lawyer should use "reasonable efforts
to prevent the harm" threatened by
any corporate officer who "is engaged
in or intends action, or a refusal to act,
that is a violation of law and is likely to
result in significant harm" to the corpo-
ration.
Those reasonable efforts include
seeking reconsideration, or referring
the matter to a higher authority, in-
cluding, if necessary, the board of di-
rectors. The section advises that the
lawyer's actions should be "designed
to minimize disruption and the risk of
disclosing confidences." However, if
even the board persists in what the
lawyer views as "clearly a violation of
law.., likely to result in substantial in-
jury to the organization," the lawyer
may go outside the corporation and
disclose confidences to thwart the
action.
This raises the very difficult issue of
"whistle blowing." Should the lawyer
be encouraged to circumvent a
corporation's board of directors when
it persists in a course of action he be-
lieves harmful and illegal, when the
action is not the subjeqt of legal
process? In addition to the question of
the lawyer's liability, there is always
the question of which alternative injury
is really worse from the corporation's
perspective. Action by counsel to cir-
cumvent a board of directors entails
disclosure of confidences which may
bring great harm to the corporation.
On the other hand, the eventual in-
jury, if accurately predicted and not
disclosed, may cause more harm.
Lawyers have always had twu basic
duties of loyalty: one to the client and
one, as a professional, to the legal sys-
tem. In a few traditional instances, the
duty to'the client has, by necessity,
been deemed secondary to the profes-
sional duty. The most notably is when
the client divulges he is about to com-
mit a serious crime.
The ABA's Draft Rules would appear
to expand the scope of this professional
duty considerably, especially as to cor-
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porate lawyers. If adopted, the rules
would require corporate counsel to
consider a number of interests, only
some of which will be those of the per-
sons normally dealt with as the "cli-
ent." In ways that cannot fully be ap-
preciated now, the lawyer-client
relationship and the confidences at-
tendant to it, would probably have to
give way to new ethical standards.
The Kutak Commission's push for
new duties and obligations for lawyers
has been given teeth by the rhetoric
and actions of public officials. SEC
Chairman Harold Williams has time
and again stated he thinks corporate
counsel is a "critical contributor" to the
corporate accountability process who
has societal responsibilities. 5 He has
called for corporate counsel with an el-
ement of independence who will ad-
vise against conduct that is technically
legal but nevertheless unethical. He be-
lieves that the advice of in-house coun-
sel in particular "should be textured to
include the social purposes the law is
intended to serve and the societal ex-
pectations flowing therefrom." 6 Fur-
ther, Chairman Williams has criticized
the proposals of the Kutak Commission
for not going far enough in the imposi-
tion of affirmative duties on counsel.
The SEC was leading the charge in
efforts to change standards of profes-
sional conduct before Harold Williams
became its chairman. The Commission
has, in a number of enforcement cases,
articulated new duties for lawyers un-
der the securities laws, which, if
breached, would constitute aiding and
abetting a client's violation. In some
cases these duties do not run' to the
identified client, but to investors gener-
ally. The National Student Marketing
case 7 and the pending Rule 2(e) pro-
ceeding In the Matter of William Carter
and Charles Johnson8 are two examples of
Commission initiatives to discipline
corporate counsel for conduct which,
in the Commission's view, did not sat-
isfy a lawyer's duties under the federal
securities laws.
The SEC's decision to formulate pro-
fessional standards for securities law-
yers is reflected in the liberal use it has
made of Rule 2(e)9 to discipline attor-
neys for unethical conduct in the past
decade. I should note that the IRS is
contemplating whether to exercise its
administrative authority to discipline
tax lawyers who do not meet certain
professional standards in rendering tax
opinions.'0 Presumably, the IRS would
formulate those standards.
Beyond enforcement cases, there are
also rule-making proposals which have
been made to the SEC which, if adop-
ted, would significantly alter the rela-
tionship of counsel to the corporation.
Last summer, the SEC granted the re-
quest of a public interest group and
published for public comment the so-
called "Georgetown Petitions."" In
general, the petitions propose rules
which would require companies to cer-
tify to stockholders each year that all
employed or retained attorneys were
instructed to report to the board of di-
rectors any corporate activities that "vi-
olate or may violate the law." In addi-
tion, the rules would require
companies to disclose to shareholders
written agreements between a corpora-
tion and its outside attorney that spec-
ify, among other things, the frequency
and nature of the counsel's contacts
with the board and his obligations re-
garding any illegal conduct he might
discover. The Commission was
swamped with negative comment, and
declined to act on the proposals. How-
ever, the Commission indicated that if
the private sector does not take action
to change the role of corporate counsel
the SEC may reconsider the matter.12
As you may know, I was a Commis-
sioner at the time the Georgetown Peti-
tions were published, and I dissented
froam the Commission's decision to
publish them. I expressed my belief
that the SEC does not have any sub-
stantive authority to regulate attorneys
or the practice of law in this manner. In
my opinion, the proposed rules would
improperly infringe upon or interfere
with the right to counsel, or would reg-
ulate matters which are governed by
state law and not the federal securities
law.
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However, my objections to the
Georgetown Petitions go to public pol-
icy considerations as well as legal ques-
tions about the extent of the
Commission's jurisdiction. Further, my
policy problems with the Georgetown
Petitions extend to the Kutak
Commission's and other similar pro-
posals. I am concerned that the adop-
tion of these new standards for profes-
sional ethics will result in an identity
crisis for the corporate lawyer which in
turn will result in impaired legal service
for the corporate client without any
public interest being effectively served.
In the effort to promote professional
accountability for lawyers, we may be
losing sight of the importance of the
advisor and advocate roles which the
corporate counsel has traditionally
played. Moreover, we may be over-
looking the increasing powers of the
regulators, at the expense of the private
sector, to dictate the future role of the
corporate lawyer.
In my mind, there is not a clear line
between expansion of the societal re-
sponsibilities of corporate counsel and
government conscription of corporate
counsel as a "civil policeman" to dis-
close confidences and enforce the law.
Because that line is blurred in concept,
it will no doubt be blurred in practice.
When a corporate lawyer finds himself
on a tightrope, balancing both corpo-
rate and public interests, his role be-
comes too confused to be of real value
to his client. The attorney-client rela-
tionship under those circumstances
will necessarily change. It is difficult for
me to understand how a client would
continue to value a lawyer as his advi-
sor and representative in many in-
stances. I doubt a lawyer would be con-
sulted on matters of significance for
fear that confidences may be disclosed
in the name of the lawyer's profes-
sional duty.
I am also disturbed that the pro-
posed alterations to the counsel-
corporation relationship may lead to a
compromise of the corporate client's
civil liberties. The business community
is entitled to be represented by effec-
tive counsel, and to be protected from
self-incrimination. Moreover, the
client's privilege as to confidentiality
has been well established in the law
and cannot be waived except by the cli-
ent.
I have another problem which con-
cerns the effect lawyers have on busi-
ness decisions. The cautionary advice
of lawyers frequently puts a chill on
business judgment and risk taking.
However, such advice is increasingly
requested to protect against liabilities
which may flow from a corporation's
mistaken regulatory strategies. Of
course, this is the intention behind the
SEC's professional responsibility pro-
gram-to use private lawyers to en-
force regulatory policies.
In the abstract this sounds like a fine
idea. In practice, however, it makes
lawyers and their corporate clients risk
adverse instead of risk takers. This
dampening of the entrepreneurial
spirit is bad for the economy at any
tim, but especially today. I am con-
cerned that successful imposition of the
new professional obligations would
make lawyers even more conservative
in their advice to corporate clients, and
have a detrimental effect on the exer-
cise of business judgment by corpora-
tions.
In my opinion, if the role of corpo-
rate lawyer is cast too far beyond that
of advocate and advisor, counsel will
suffer an identity crisis. The role of
agent, representative or confidant, as a
practical matter, cannot normally be
reconciled with that of independent
watchdog. Overseeing management's
conduct and scrutinizing business
judgments are not within a lawyer's ex-
pertise and can conflict with the tradi-
tional functions of corporate counsel.
When a lawyer is asked to serve two
masters whose interests do not neces-
sarily coincide, confusion arises and
breeds ineffective performance to both
masters.
In addition, the constant balancing
of the client's private interests against
the perceived interests of the public
will render the lawyer perhaps uncer-
tain as to his own advice and con-
cerned about his own liability. He will
become a less valued corporate advi-
sor, especially when there is the risk
that confidential information could be
disclosed. Requiring the lawyer to be-
come the architect for corporate ac-
countability or the civilian policeman
who aids enforcement of the federal
laws will redound to the long-run det-
riment of the corporation in running its
affairs and the public whose expecta-
tions will not be met. I am disturbed
that the corporate lawyer's role is being
restructured in the name of ethical or
corporate accountability in such a fash-
ion as to impair the lawyer's traditional
role of advocate and advisor. As advo-
cate and advisor the lawyer likewise
serves valued public interests.
The burden of corporate accountabil-
ity should be shouldered by those di-
rectly responsible-a corporation's
board of directors and the public au-
thorities charged with resolving the
tough political issues involving govern-
ment and business relations. Making
counsel the marshall for corporate gov-
ernance is a measure designed to avoid
those political issues. In my opinion,
the SEC has made a serious mistake in
attempting to regulate the practice of
law and to promote corporate account-
ability by claiming that lawyers have
far-reaching duties to the public under
the federal securities laws. At the same
time, it is the heretofore unmet obliga-
tion of our elected public authorities,
not corporate America or corporate
counsel, to define the public interest
and obtain a consensus for regulatory
policies. N
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